standing

UPDATE: Mass. High Court Takes Plaintiff Out of Game, Upholds Boston’s Transfer to Red Sox of Easement Rights Next to Fenway Park

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In my post last week on Pishev v. City of Somerville (pdf), I mentioned that the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) would be soon deciding another important urban renewal case, Marchese v. Boston Redevelopment Authority. It turns out “soon” was the next day.

Jersey Street, outside Fenway Park

In its September 13, 2019 decision (pdf) in Marchese, the SJC upheld actions taken by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) with respect to what is known as a “demonstration project” under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 121B, section 46(f). This case focused on a permanent taking by the BRA of easement rights in Yawkey Way (now known as Jersey Street), and the transfer of those easement rights to the Boston Red Sox for so long as baseball games are played at Fenway Park.

The plaintiff, Marchese, challenged the taking and the conveyance, alleging that the area was

Mass. Appeals Court Upholds Somerville’s Union Square Revitalization Plan

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In 2012, the City of Somerville, the Somerville Redevelopment Authority (SRA), and the Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development approved the Union Square Revitalization Plan (the Plan), an urban renewal plan to be administered by the SRA under M.G.L. c. 121B. A taxpayer group and a landowner (Pishev) appealed the approval of the Plan, alleging that it violates Chapter 121B. In late July the Appeals Court upheld the Plan’s approval in Pishev v. City of Somerville (pdf), 95 Mass. App. Ct. 678 (2019).

Pishev’s property is identified as a parcel subject to eminent domain taking by the SRA under the Plan pursuant to the powers granted to the SRA by Chapter 121B. The Appeals Court first addressed the issue of standing and found that the taxpayer group did not have standing, citing St. Botolph’s Citizens Committee, Inc. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority (pdf) and finding that “[n]o sufficient causal or connective link exists between the injuries or

Mass. Legislature Weighs Changes to Zoning Act; Quick Decision on Plaintiff’s Standing is Proposed

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Two bills pending at the Massachusetts State House would amend the state Zoning Act, known as Chapter 40A, which governs zoning in every Massachusetts city and town except Boston. The Zoning Act is seldom amended, even though courts and land use lawyers are well aware of its shortcomings. This is no doubt because zoning is often a hotly-contested political issue. But commonsense changes to Chapter 40A, while difficult to accomplish, can yield significant benefits for all concerned with real estate development in the Commonwealth.

Will Standing Determination be Front-loaded?

A bill introduced in the Massachusetts Senate, Senate Bill 1024 (pdf), tackles one of the most vexatious aspects of zoning for developers – the standing of abutters to sue. Standing is a prerequisite for filing a case in court; generally speaking, to have standing to sue, plaintiffs must show they’re harmed or that their rights are impacted in some material way. In other contexts a defendant can quickly move to dismiss

Under Massachusetts Zoning Law, Abutter’s Presumptive Standing to Appeal Can Be Rebutted Even if Unchallenged by Defendant

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There’s no shortage of case law on the issue of standing to maintain a zoning appeal. A case decided by the Appeals Court reminds us why the issue is still being discussed after all these years. In Talmo v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Framingham, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 626 (2018), the court addressed whether a trial judge could determine on his own (without the defendant pressing it) that a direct abutter’s presumptive standing was rebutted. The court concluded that the trial judge properly did so.

In 2009, Talmo sought zoning enforcement from Framingham’s building commissioner requesting that his neighbors, the Buckleys, be ordered to cease using a converted barn as a residence. The Buckleys had lived in the barn since the mid- to late-1980s and raised a family there. The barn was converted to a residence without any permits authorizing the renovation. A building permit was obtained in 2004 for an addition to the barn’s living space.

The

Mass. Appeals Court Ventures Onto High Wire of Zoning Standing Doctrine, Answers Vexing Question

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It’s about time!  Not since the notable 1961 adverse possession case Kershaw v. Zecchini have real estate litigators had an important decision inspired by circus performers.

In its recent decision in Murrow v. ESH Circus Arts, LLC, the Appeals Court answers a question that concurring Justice Peter J. Rubin notes “has vexed the judges of the trial court, who have reached different conclusions about it.”  In zoning appeals under M.G.L. c. 40A (the Zoning Act), plaintiffs may have the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that they are “persons aggrieved” – meaning they have standing to appeal.  This judicially-created presumption, which originated in the 1957 case Marotta v. Board of Appeals of Revere, is conferred on “parties in interest” as described in Section 11 of the Zoning Act.  Section 11 defines “parties in interest” as:

the petitioner [i.e., the applicant for zoning relief], abutters, owners of land directly opposite on any public or private