Sunpin v. Petersham: Mass. SJC Narrows the Path to Denying Large-Scale Solar
This week the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) issued its decision in Sunpin Energy Services, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Petersham (pdf), its first decision addressing the solar energy provision of M.G.L. c. 40A, § 3 (the so-called Dover Amendment) since the court’s 2022 decision in Tracer Lane II Realty, LLC v. Waltham. The SJC used Sunpin to affirm the statutory protections afforded solar energy systems while clarifying, at least to a certain extent, a municipality’s ability to deny such protected uses. The court confirmed that while municipalities must provide reasonable opportunities for solar energy systems, they are free to impose special permit conditions, though such conditions are constrained by the statutory requirement that denial of a special permit for a solar energy system must be “necessary to protect the public health, safety or welfare.” M.G.L. c. 40A, § 3, ¶ 9. Therefore, zoning boards must undertake a site-specific, necessity-based analysis tied to public health, safety, or welfare when faced with an application seeking a special permit for a protected solar energy system.
Sunpin Energy Services and landowner Ralph Lapinkas sought to build a 4.3 MW ground-mounted solar array with battery storage on a roughly 24-acre wooded parcel in Petersham – a rural town that is 97% forested and zoned entirely residential-agricultural. The project required clearing about 14 acres of trees. Petersham’s bylaw allows large-scale solar systems as-of-right only within a tiny, 5.16-acre town-owned overlay district; all projects elsewhere require a special permit.
Sunpin applied for the requisite special permit. Two of three board members voted to approve, but because M.G.L. c. 40A, § 9 requires a unanimous vote of a three-member board, the single dissenting member’s vote defeated the application. The dissent – memorialized in a 26‑page statement – became the operative decision. The dissenting member acknowledged that Sunpin satisfied the zoning bylaw’s solar‑specific standards, but relied on broad “intent and purpose” language about town character and general welfare, tree removal, patterns of land fragmentation, and concerns about the project’s community benefits, in justifying her “no” vote.
Sunpin appealed, and the Land Court entered summary judgment affirming the board’s decision. Sunpin appealed the Land Court’s judgment and the Appeals Court reversed. The Town then sought further appellate review, which the SJC granted. In its decision, the SJC vacated the Land Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its analysis.
The court held that under the Dover Amendment’s solar provision, M.G.L. c. 40A, § 3, ¶ 9, a municipality may deny a special permit for a solar energy system only where “necessary to protect the public health, safety or welfare” – and that standard requires an individualized, site-specific analysis. “Necessary” carries its plain, narrow meaning, and boards cannot convert general purpose clauses about promoting public welfare into an open‑ended veto power over protected solar uses.
Though the standard the SJC has articulated is not a model of clarity, certain points are evident. First, “necessity” does not mean “preference.” A board must explain why denying a specific project, on a specific site, is required to protect health, safety, or welfare – not simply why approval would conflict with aesthetic preferences or generalized zoning purposes. Second, a board must conduct an individualized, site‑specific analysis even in the special permit context. Denials cannot rest on blanket opposition to deforestation, skepticism about “community benefits,” or any other hypothetical “parade of horribles.” Third, every municipality must provide a reasonable opportunity for large-scale solar energy systems to be built. Reiterating its holding in Tracer Lane, the SJC confirmed that a functional ban created by facially neutral regulations will be overturned. In Petersham, which is 97 percent forested, a policy of rejecting any project involving “significant tree cutting” would effectively – and improperly – prevent the siting of solar systems across 97 percent of the town.
Sunpin affirms what the Legislature intended and what Tracer Lane presaged: solar energy systems are a protected land use that municipalities must accommodate through reasonable regulation – not pretext or preference – and a denial will be upheld only where “necessary to protect the public health, safety or welfare.”
Looking forward, the combination of Sunpin’s necessity standard, its demand for site‑specific analysis, and the Legislature’s directive for statewide siting standards, should reduce friction and create a clearer path for solar projects. Municipalities retain meaningful oversight through objective, solar‑specific dimensional criteria – setbacks, height, screening, stormwater, access, decommissioning – and through robust, evidence‑based conditions. What they cannot do is convert broad aspirations into a de facto veto over a use that the statute protects.